Justice delayed: Establishing a War Crimes Court in Liberia
In 2009, the Liberian Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) released its final report where it made several recommendations designed to promote justice and reconciliation in post-war Liberia. One of them was the creation of a war crimes court. Despite persistent calls for its establishment, concrete action was not taken until 2024, when the Office for the Establishment of War and Economic Crimes Court for Liberia (OEWECC) was created by President Boakai. This marked a first important milestone and provided renewed hope for advocates of the court. However, there is still a long road ahead.
While the Director of the Office, Cllr. Barbu has said that the first indictments will be issued in 2027, the OEWECC has yet to publicly tackle the thorny questions of how the court will be structured, designed, and resourced. Without a clear road map there is a risk that the OEWECC will fail to capitalise on the opportunity to make meaningful progress towards a working court.
The TRC’s vision for an “Extraordinary Criminal Court”
The groundwork for the creation of a court was laid by the TRC in 2009. The TRC envisaged a hybrid structure presided over by both Liberian and international judges, independent from the Liberian judicial system, that would have the competence to adjudicate cases of gross violations committed during the civil wars. In addition to providing a draft statute for the creation of the court, the TRC went as far as providing a list of individuals that could potentially be prosecuted. The list included eight leaders of the warring factions and an additional 116 individuals who the TRC believed to be the most notorious perpetrators based on the testimonies of victims and witnesses shared before the Commission.
Political inertia around accountability
Since the TRC’s initial recommendation, the creation of the court has loomed as a spectre over Liberian politics. Despite seemingly widespread support for the initiative, successive administrations have taken little action, and a certain inertia has plagued the issue of accountability. Each administration’s failure to act has often been linked to the fact that many individuals implicated in crimes have held influential positions in government, allowing them to successfully manufacture and manoeuvre political alliances to block progress on the court. For example, in 2021, Senator Prince Johnson – first on the TRC’s list of most notorious perpetrators – proposed the creation of a “Transitional Justice Commission” to revisit the conclusions of the TRC and the question of amnesties. Although this proposal was never realised, sufficient political will to challenge the status quo and work towards the establishment of a war crimes court has consistently been lacking.
The creation of Office for the establishment of the Court – a critical step
Against this backdrop, it took fifteen years for any concrete action to be taken. It was not until May 2024, that President Joseph Nyuma Boakai took the first crucial step by creating the OEWECC. The Office was established by Executive Order, thereby bypassing the legislature. The Order was renewed in May 2025. The office is mandated to investigate, design and prescribe the methodology, mechanisms and process for the establishment of both a national anti-corruption court and a war crimes court. In essence, its role is not to begin the investigative or prosecution work, but rather to carefully map the path towards the establishment of the two courts by considering what form the courts will take, their staffing, budget and a timeline for launch.
The first year of the office was not without its difficulties. The appointment of the first Executive Director Jonathan Massaquoi, was met with public outcry given his work as legal representative of both Agnes Taylor and Gibril Massaquoi, who have both been accused of crimes during the civil war. Jonathan Massaquoi has represented both individuals in claims against NGO’s, raising serious concerns about his independence. Following heavy pressure and criticism, notably from civil society organisations, he was removed from office in August 2024 and replaced by Cllr. Jallah Barbu who was selected consultatively by a Search Committee.
Since Cllr. Barbu took office in November of last year, the Office has continued to face challenges. Chief amongst them is the issue of funding. The Office was allocated $500,000 in 2024 by the Liberian government, a number that Cllr. Barbu says falls far short of the office’s envisaged budget required to cover outreach, and the running of the office. In its first three months of operation under Jonathan Massaquoi, $132,000 was allegedly spent by the office although details of this expenditure have not been provided, resulting in further outcry by civil society advocates.
Charting a way forward and building a framework for the court
If the Office to succeed in its mandate, the Liberian government needs to commit to ensuring that both the Office and the court are adequately funded. This is even more important in light of funding shortages resulting from US aid cuts. Where Liberia could previously rely on the support of the US, this may no longer be the case.
Funding is not the only challenge the OEWECC and a subsequent court face. If the Office is to achieve its goal of establishing an operational war crimes court, a clear and detailed road map of the steps that need to be taken to establish that court is key. The road map at a minimum should address primary issues like timeline, the desired model of the court and its position within the Liberian legal framework, and the budget that will be required. In this regard, the Office has the benefit of hindsight and should look to the lessons learned by other tribunals and mechanisms that have been set up to address crimes of the past. For example, numerous lessons can be learned from the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, which used a model similar to that proposed by the TRC.
Key stakeholders that can push this agenda forward and help to build trust in the institution need to be identified early on. In parallel, it is imperative the Office begins to identify the experts nationally, regionally and internationally to build the capacity within the Liberian police and judiciary to investigate and adjudicate core international crimes.
Another key issue to be addressed in a road map is the Office’s plan for victim protection and support. Here again, the Office should take the opportunity to learn from other mechanisms and their experiences. If victim protection and support is not built into the structure of a court early on, not only is there the risk that it will be poorly integrated at a later stage, but also that victims and survivors will not trust or engage with the court from the outset.
Once a clear and detailed road map is produced, and the plan for the War Crime Court is on stable footing, only then can the Office really begin to address other politically charged issues like the number and order of case files that should be prosecuted, and the role of evidence collected by the TRC in this regard.
Accountability for the crimes of Liberia’s civil wars has for many years been the victim of a political stalemate. There are still individuals in government who oppose the idea of a war crimes court, making it even more imperative that the plan proposed by the Office is feasible and realistic given resource constraints. Anything else risks that efforts stagnate while political will dwindles and elusive funding is sought. Moreover, as more time passes those responsible for the crimes of the civil war, as well as their victims continue to age and die. It is critical justice does not arrive too late. The Office has been tasked with no small feat, and it is important that both the Liberian government and the international community step up to provide the required resources and technical assistance required to build a solid foundation and get efforts of the ground.
